The signs of forecast errors can be predicted using the difference between individuals' forecasts and the average of earlier forecasts of the same variable. It is possible to improve forecasts without worsening any. It is diffi cult to reconcile this result with the rational expectations hypothesis because the average of earlier forecasts is in the information set of the forecasters.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we attempt to determine whether apparent rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis by analysis of survey data is the result of auxiliary assumptions about loss functions. In empirical work with survey data, it is generally assumed that survey participants have quadratic loss functions or at least that they report the mean of their subjective probability distribution (see, for instance, the recent survey by Elliot and Timmermann, 2008 , which summarizes empirical studies of rationality for infl ation and output forecasts). Without any assumptions about agents' aims it is possible to reconcile any behavior with full rationality, but a quadratic loss function seems restrictive. Several authors have considered the theoretical implications of asymmetric loss functions, including Granger (1968 Granger ( , 1999 , Varian (1974) , Zellner (1986) , Ehrbeck (1993) , Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) , Weiss (1996) , Christofersen and Deibold (1997) , Batchelor and Peel (1998) , Granger and Pesaran (2000) and Pesaran and Skouros (2002) . They all note that the evidence against the joint hypothesis rationality and quadratic losses is perfectly consistent with rationality and asymmetric losses if disturbances are heteroskedastic. They also note that it is diffi cult to derive implications from relatively weak assumptions about loss functions without imposing strong assumptions about the data-generating process. Recently, Patton and Timmermann (2007) derived testable implications of the joint hypotheses of rational expectations, a homogeneous loss function and a data-generating process such that the conditional distribution of the variable being forecast is a function of the conditional mean and the conditional variance.
In empirical work, quadratic loss functions have been generalized to fi nite-dimensional parametric classes of loss functions whose parameters are estimated by GMM in an initial stage. Using this approach Elliott et al. (2005 have found weaker evidence against rationality in survey data on forecasts of nominal output growth that was obtained assuming a quadratic loss function.
We consider an implication of rational expectations which requires almost no assumptions about loss functions except the assumption that losses decrease as forecasts move closer to realizations. In particular, it is not necessary for the loss function to be homogeneous or to belong to a known parametric family of loss functions. Nor it is necessary to assume that different forecasters have the same loss function, nor that this function is time invariant for any one forecaster. Thus it is not necessary to assume that losses are a function of forecast errors alone. Finally, we do not need to make strong assumptions about the data-generating process. It is not required that disturbances to the variable being forecast are homoskedastic or even belong to a fi nite-dimensional parametric class of distributions with time-varying parameters.
The only additional assumption that must be made about the data-generating process and the loss function is that they do not create peso problems, that is, rare events which may not be observed in a fi nite sample which are nonetheless very important to forecasters in expected value.
Our results imply that it is possible to recommend revisions to forecasts which lower losses assuming only that losses are reduced if a forecast is changed slightly in the direction of the outcome. The striking pattern noted in this paper is that whenever forecasts of quarterly averages of annualized yields on 30-year treasury bonds are very far from the average of older forecasts of the same variable, they are too far from this lagged average. That is, forecasts far higher (lower) than the lagged average forecast are always higher (lower) than the outcome.
In this paper, we defi ne 'far' from the lagged average forecast as far compared to the root mean forecast error of the lagged average forecast. All 1100 forecasts which are at least 2.6 times this root mean squared error from the lagged average forecast are too far from the lagged average forecast. This result is striking because forecasts are published each month, so the lagged average forecast is known by all forecasters.
Even the assumption that forecasters' losses are reduced when forecast errors are reduced is somewhat restrictive and some loss function would reconcile the data with the rational expectations hypothesis. Furthermore, it is impossible to rule out peso problems: survey participants' predictions may refl ect rational expectations of the probability of rare extreme events which are not observed in the sample. Nonetheless, the results presented here appear to be striking evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis. They are also very diffi cult to reconcile with the view that forecasters or economic agents in general exhibit herd behavior, that is, understate the difference between their opinion and the conventional wisdom. If anything, the data support the view that agents overstate this difference if the lagged average is taken to represent the conventional wisdom.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefl y describe our dataset, while the third section describes our methodology used to build a measure of a too 'far' distance between analysts' forecasts and average lagged values of the interest rate on 30-year treasury bonds for the same period, which can be usefully used to predict the signs of forecasts error and so to improve them. In the fourth section, we discuss our results, which show that it is possible to improve 1100 forecasts without worsening any. Concluding remarks are contained in the fi fth section.
YIELD FORECASTS DATASET
This paper analyses the large dataset collected in Peterson (2001) from the Blue Chip Financial Survey. It concerns interest rates over eight different maturities (3-month and 6-month US Treasury bill yields, and 1, 2, 5-, 7-, 10-and 30-year US Treasury bond yields) over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Therefore, this sample is very rich in information and lets us determine whether our method works for a period which includes a recession (1990) (1991) . The master database is an unbalanced panel including more than 28,000 forecasts of professional economists from banks, fi nancial fi rms, prominent corporations and academia recorded in the Blue Chip Financial Survey. A new time series is automatically created for any change in affi liation, name or composition of a forecaster or group of forecasters.
Each month, participants in the survey submit forecasts of the average quarterly yield of each of the eight maturities for each of the next four quarters. Therefore analysts' forecasts consist of a multistep-ahead set including three periodic revisions for one-quarter through four-quarter-ahead horizons. To measure forecast errors, we compute the difference between the n-step-ahead quarterly forecast and the quarterly realized yield obtained as the monthly average from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors release on the constant maturity yield.
We focus on forecasts of interest rate yields on 30-year treasury bonds. Our approach is not invariably successful for interest rates at shorter maturities. We briefl y discuss our results for the shorter maturities. It is important to consider the fact that the record of successful predictions of the signs of forecast errors reported below concerns only one of the bonds which we analyzed. Waldmann (1995) had a perfect record forecasting the signs of forecast errors in the quarterly average of the annualized yield on 91-day Treasury bills using a similar method. Waldmann analyzed a much smaller dataset with only 506 forecasts in total; thus his perfect record is much less impressive than the not-quite-perfect record reported here.
METHODOLOGY
Defi ne r t as the average interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds in the secondary market in quarter t. Defi ne f itj as a forecast of the ith forecaster of the average interest rate of maturity m in the tth quarter in the sample based on information available j months before the quarter ended. Defi ne I itj as an indicator variable which indicates non-missing f itj . Defi ne f t,j as the average of f itj across forecasters. Note that our data include 'forecasts' of the current quarter, e.g. f it1 -the forecast of the annualized interest rate on 30-year Treasury bonds made by the ith forecaster at the beginning of the third month of the same quarter.
We use an extremely simple technique to test the claim that whenever forecasts are much higher (lower) than the average of lagged forecasts they are higher (lower) than the outcome. To be precise fi rst defi ne s where B is the largest integer less than or equal to k/3. Note that so long as k is greater than j, f s,k and s 2 t,k are calculated with information available when forecast f itj is made.
The value 2.6 was chosen ex post as the smallest value such that the result holds. Thus we snooped enough to estimate one parameter.
1 To restate the result, if the difference between a forecast and the average of forecasts lagged 1, 2, 3 or 4 months is greater than 2.6 times the mean squared error of that lagged average calculated with past data, then the forecast can be improved by moving it 10 basis points closer to that lagged average.
Note that this result implies that some forecasters have not chosen a forecasting rule, which minimizes any function of forecast errors that is reduced as the forecast errors are reduced. For any such function, the modifi ed rule in which forecasters calculate their forecasts then reduce forecasts by the smallest allowed change (0.1%). This is true even if the loss function is asymmetric and disturbances are heteroskedastic. This is even true if the loss function is time varying, and if each forecaster has a different loss function.
To restate the result, if the difference between a forecast and the average of forecasts lagged 1, 2, 3 or 4 months is greater than 2.6 times the mean squared error of that lagged average calculated with past data, then the forecast can be improved by moving it 10 basis points closer to that lagged average.
In our sample, all 1082 forecasts which are above at least one of the four intervals calculated for averages lagged 1, 2, 3 and 4 months are above the outcome, and all 18 forecasts which are below one of the four intervals are below the outcome. This means that the technique improves 1100 forecasts without worsening any. Notably relatively few (80) forecasts are clearly wrong based on the difference with the average forecast lagged just 1 month. In contrast, large numbers of forecasts are detectably wrong based on information lagged 2, 3 and 4 months. Average forecasts approach the truth relatively slowly, so the intervals are not all that much larger when older lagged averages are used.
In contrast, forecasters act as if they receive valuable information every month, so many forecasts are much further from the 2-month lagged average than from the 1-month lagged average. Using information available to the forecasters it is possible to determine that many of these forecasts are much too far from the 2-month lagged average. Results are shown in Table I . 1 In contrast with his much smaller dataset, Waldmann chose the critical level a priori. The gaps between lagged average forecasts and the forecasts we correctly predict are too far from the lagged average range from 339 to 347 basis points depending on the lag. This is important because the one key issue is whether our result could be due to a peso problem, where a possible extreme event which does not happen to occur in the sample period has an important effect on expected values. Certainly September 2008 has included extreme events related to interest rates, yet over the period from 2 September 2008 to 29 September 2008 the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds varied only from a high of 4.41 to a low of 4.13 (US Treasury, 2008) . The large event would have to be much more dramatic than the events of September 2008 to rationalize the forecasts in our sample. Table II classifi es improved forecasts by the time from the forecast to the realization, that is, the number of months from the forecast to the end of the quarter whose average 30-year Treasury bond yield was forecast. Unsurprisingly, it becomes more diffi cult to predict the signs of forecast errors as this interval becomes longer. Strikingly, it is possible to predict the sign of 156 forecasts more than a year before the realization. Table III classifi es improved forecasts by the quarter to which the improved forecast refers. At least one forecast with an error of detectable sign refers to each quarter from the fi rst quarter of 1987 until the fi rst quarter of 1997, that is, from the fi rst quarter in the dataset to the 5th from the last. Relatively few forecasts refer to outcomes from the 2nd quarter of 1997 through the 1st quarter of 1998 and none of these are improved. Our ability to improve forecasts is not based on our procedure happening to fl ag forecasts which refer to a few quarters in which something unusual happened to interest rates. Table IV classifi es improved forecasts by the quarter in which the forecasts were made. Since the series of forecasts are monthly, we have summed over the 3 months in a quarter to make the table smaller. The majority of the improved forecasts were made in the fi rst quarter of the year. This would correspond to a large number of forecasts made in the fi rst quarter, which are much higher than the lagged average. It appears that early in each year many forecasters predict that future 30-year Treasury bond yields will be much higher than generally predicted in the past. In our sample, they are wrong 100% of the time. Table V shows that the vast majority of forecasting teams make at least one forecast which can be improved using lagged data. Only 17 forecasting teams make no such predictable errors and each of them makes relatively few forecasts. Only 424 forecasts were made by teams such that we can improve none of the team's forecasts. Many members of the 17 teams with perfect records made improvable forecasts as part of other teams. A total of 11 forecasters made no improvable forecasts whether alone or as part of a team. These forecasters made a total of 254 forecasts.
Such striking evidence of irrationality is not found for lower maturities. Many fewer predictions fall out of the calculated intervals, so we propose many fewer changes: a total of 115 for the seven maturities shorter than 30 years. One of the changes we propose, a reduction by the minimum 10 basis points of Richard Berner and Russell Sheldon's prediction made in May 1994 of the average yield on 5-year Treasury bonds in the second quarter of 1994, worsens that forecast, so our overall record is 1214 forecasts improved and one forecast worsened. Results are shown in Table VI .
This means that our record of 1100 right out of 1100 predictions of the signs of forecast errors is based, in part, on two ex post choices. It applies to the interest rates of 30-year Treasury bills which are one of eight securities which we investigated and it relies on the parameter 2.6 which was chosen 
